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SEEING CAN BE DECEIVING: PHOTOGRAPHIC
EVIDENCE IN A VISUAL AGE-HOW MUCH WEIGHT
DOES IT DESERVE?
As the prevalence of visual media in modern society has ex-
panded,1 the use of photographic evidence in modern courts has
increased.2 Litigants have introduced photographs as evidence in
the United States since the mid-nineteenth century.' With the in-
troduction of sixteen-millimeter motion pictures in the early
1920's, the advent of color photography in the early 1940's, and the
appearance of videotapes in the late 1950's, the use of photo-
graphic evidence has accelerated. 4 Impressed by advances in pho-
tography, courts generally favor photographic evidence, 5 often ac-
cording it substantial weight.' Although photographic evidence is
an asset to the adept trial lawyer, neither courts nor lawyers fully
1. Scholars have devoted considerable attention to the role of the visual media in modem
society. See, e.g., Carpenter, The New Languages, in EXPLORATIONS IN COMMUNICATION (E.
Carpenter & M. McLuhan ed. 1960); Novak, Television Shapes the Soul, in MASS MEDIA
IssuEs (L. Sellars & W. Rivers ed. 1977). A few authors highlight the psychological impact of
visual advertising techniques on society. See, e.g., W. KEY, SUBLIMINAL SEDUCTION (1973); T.
SCHWARTZ, THE RESPONsIV E CHORD (1973). Susan Sontag thoughtfully discusses the manner
in which photographs affect the modem perception of reality. See S. SONTAG, ON PHOTOGRA-
PHY (1973).
Statistics also confirm the prevalence of the visual media. For instance, 98% of American
homes contain at least one television set. THE WORLD ALtANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 1983, at
432. The average television viewing time for people over 18 years old is almost 30 hours per
week. See id. at 431. In addition, the motion picture industry earned record profits in 1982,
selling 1.165 billion tickets for $3.449 billion, a 16% increase from the $2.966 billion earned
in 1981. Beaupre & Thompson, Eighth Annual Grosses Gloss, Fnom CoMME:NT, Apr. 1983, at
62.
2. See infra notes 10-65 and accompanying text.
3. Photographic evidence first appeared in the United States soon after French painter
Jacques M. Daguerre invented a workable photographic process in 1839. 1 C. Scor, PHOTO-
6RAPmc EVIDENCE § 1 (2d ed. 1969). United States courts admitted photographic evidence
as early as 1860. See Luco v. United States, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 515, 541 (1860).
4. See C. ScoTT, supra note 3; 2 id. § 714.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 10-65.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 56-65.
7. Several commentators discuss the utility of photographic evidence within the broader
context of demonstrative evidence. See, e.g., Dombroff, Utilizing Photographs as Demon-
strative Evidence, TRIAL, Dec. 1982, at 71; McCullough & Underwood, How to Prepare and
Use Demonstrative Evidence in a Civil Trial, PRAC. LAw., Mar. 1982, at 19, 29-34; Moore,
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understand the capacity of photographic evidence for deception or
improper influence.8
This Note examines the current evidentiary status of the major
categories of photographic evidence-photographs, motion pic-
tures, videotapes and X-rays. The Note first explains the general
admissibility standard for photographic evidence and then ana-
lyzes each major category, focusing on problems of deception and
unjustifiable reliance. The Note concludes that factfinders often
give photographic evidence more weight than the evidentiary foun-
dation justifies. Consequently, the Note proposes a test that em-
phasizes greater control on the weight that factfinders accord pho-
tographic evidence. By focusing on the reliability of photographic
evidence as well as its pertinence,9 this test ensures that the reli-
ance placed on photographic evidence reflects more accurately its
evidentiary value.
GENERAL STANDARD OF ADMISSIBILITY FOR PHOTOGRAPHIC
EVIDENCE
Under the common law, a court may admit a photograph into
evidence if the photograph is relevant to a material issue and is
properly authenticated. 10 This standard also applies to motion pic-
tures,11 videotapes,12 and X-rays.15 The relevance and authentica-
tion of photographic evidence are matters within the trial judge's
Basic Practice Guide for Demonstrative, Experimental and Scientific Evidence, 50 INs.
CouNs. J. 279, 281-87 (1983).
8. See infra notes 66-141 and accompanying text.
9. Pertinence depends on the relationship between the weight of photographic evidence
and the purpose for which the evidence is admitted. For an application of this concept to
the use of photographic evidence, see infra text accompanying note 217.
10. See, e.g., Maze v. State, 425 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1967); People v. Donaldson, 24 MII. 2d
315, 181 N.E.2d 131 (1962); State v. Freeman, 232 Or. 267, 374 P.2d 453 (1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 919 (1963); see also McCoRMicK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVMENCE § 214 (2d
ed. 1972) [hereinfter cited as McCoRMcK].
11. See, e.g., Darden v. State, 629 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
12. See, e.g., State v. Lusk, 452 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. 1970); State v. Brooks, 30 Wash. App.
280, 633 P.2d 1345 (1981).
13. See, e.g., Layne v. State, 54 Ala. App. 529, 310 So. 2d 249 (1975); State v. Torres, 60
Hawaii 271, 589 P.2d 83 (1978).
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discretion.1" The judge's discretion is not unlimited, 5 but only an
abuse of discretion will result in reversal."8 The common law stan-
dard of admissibility for photographic evidence remains intact
under the Federal Rules of Evidence:1 7 rule 402 imposes a rele-
vancy requirement,' 8 and rule 901 mandates authentication.19
Thus, photographic material must be relevant and properly au-
thenticated under the Federal Rules of Evidence before a court
will admit it into evidence. °
Authenticating photographic evidence is not difficult. The pro-
ponent authenticates photographic evidence by showing that the
evidence accurately represents its subject.21 Authentication typi-
14. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 534 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
941 (1976); State v. Thorne, 239 S.C. 164, 121 S.E.2d 623 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 979
(1962).
15. See, e.g., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft, 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978); Bunting v. Com-
monwealth, 208 Va. 309, 157 S.E.2d 204 (1967).
16. United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Lynch v. Railway Mail
Ass'n, 375 S.W.2d 216 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
17. 2 C. Scorr, supra note 3, § 1030 (Supp. 1980); see also United States v. Hobson, 519
F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1975) (rule 401 incorporates the common law relevance standard), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 931 (1975).
18. "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution
of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not ad-
missible." FED. R. Evm. 402. "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EviD. 401.
19. "The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to ad-
missibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question
is what its proponent claims." FED. R. Evm. 901(a).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Brannon, 616 F.2d.413 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 908
(1980); Durant v. Surety Homes Corp., 582 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1978).
21. Compare People v. Donaldson, 24 Ill. 2d 315, 181 N.E.2d 131 (1962) (inadequate au-
thentication when witness could not remember taking the photograph, how long the person
in the photograph had been in police custody, or whether the clothes worn by the person in
the photograph were identical to those worn by the defendant at the time of arrest), with
Skaggs v. Davis, - Ind. App. -, 424 N.E.2d 137 (1981) (trial court properly admitted a
photograph of plaintiff's car after the defendant in a personal injury action arising from a
car accident testified that the photograph accurately represented the car on the day of the
accident, despite the plaintiff's earlier contrary testimony), and State v. Deering, 291
N.W.2d 38 (Iowa 1980) (adequate authentication when eyewitness to robbery explained the
activation of a hidden motion picture camera, the camera's location and field of view, and
its accurate portrayal of the events).
If courts required strict authentication, they could not admit X-rays or hidden surveil-
lance photographs or films because no witness could testify that the evidence accurately
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cally is provided by the testimony of a witness familiar with the
subject.22 A similar procedure is used to authenticate photographs
of objects that are either undetectable to the naked eye or mean-
ingless to the untrained eye. Experts, for example, must validate
the accuracy of photographs of microscopic fibers 23 or finger-
prints.24 The witness who authenticates a photograph's accuracy
need not have been the photographer. 25 Indeed, the witness need
not have been present when the photograph was taken.26 The
court's focus is not on the photographer's skill or on the integrity
of the development process, but rather on the witness' impression
that the photograph accurately represents its subject.27
depicted its subject. Consequently, courts have modified the general standard, admitting
both X-rays and unwitnessed photographic evidence if the proponent offers an alternate
foundation to authenticate the evidence, such as showing the camera's reliability and opera-
tion. See infra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Dillon v. State, - Ind. , 422 N.E.2d 1188 (1981) (photographs depict-
ing a rape victim's facial bruises admitted after the victim's husband testified that the pho-
tographs accurately represented the victim's appearance); Moore v. Leaseway Transp. Corp.,
49 N.Y.2d 720, 402 N.E.2d 1160, 426 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1980) (photograph of tractor trailer
identical to one demolished in an accident admitted following testimony that the photo-
graph accurately represented the tractor trailer in the accident). If the witness is equivocal
about the accuracy of a photograph, however, the court will exclude the photograph. See,
e.g., Hayes v. State, 634 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (witness could not state with
certainty that photograph accurately depicted intersection in question).
23. Driskell v. State, 659 P.2d 343 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (enlarged photographs of red
cotton fibers taken with special photographic equipment attached to a microscope admitted
after a forensic scientist testified that the photographs accurately represented the fibers
under the microscope).
24. See, e.g., People v. Beasley, 109 Ill. App. 3d 446, 440 N.E.2d 961 (1982) (photographic
enlargements of fingerprints admitted without testimony establishing an accurate represen-
tation when a latent-print examiner testified that he had prepared the enlargements and
identified them as defendant's fingerprints); cf. State v. Peoples, 227 Kan. 127, 605 P.2d 135
(1980) (enlarged photographs of bite marks on a rape victim's breast admitted when a spe-
cialist in forensic odontology testified that he had made the photographs); State v. Hunt,
297 N.C. 447, 255 S.E.2d 182 (1979) (accuracy of photographs of a shoe sole impression
established by extrinsic evidence).
25. See, e.g., Kleveland v. United States, 345 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1965); Adams v. City of
San Jose, 164 Cal. App. 2d 665, 330 P.2d 840 (1958). Contra Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 115 (1934) (dicta).
26. Higgins v. Arizona Say. & Loan Ass'n, 90 Ariz. 55, 365 P.2d 476 (1961) (en banc);
Craft v. State, 154 Ga. App. 682, 269 S.E.2d 490 (1980); Johnson v. State, 272 Ind. 427, 399
N.E.2d 360 (1980).
27. Scott v. State, 414 So. 2d 177 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); People v. Mines, 132 Ill. App. 2d
628, 270 N.E.2d 265 (1971); State v. Lockett, 232 Kan. 317, 654 P.2d 433 (1982); Darden v.
State, 629 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
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One qualification of the general authentication standard con-
cerns subjects photographed under altered conditions. If the sub-
ject of photographic evidence changed materially before the pho-
tographer recorded it, a court will exclude the evidence because no
witness could testify that the photograph accurately represents its
subject at the relevant time.28 Typically, however, courts will admit
photographic evidence that depicts changed conditions when the
jury can understand the changes in appearance that occurred be-
tween the relevant time and the time the photograph was taken.29
Courts admit photographic evidence under two distinct theo-
ries-the pictorial testimony theory and the silent witness theory.
The pictorial testimony theory treats photographic evidence as a
graphic illustration of a witness' testimony.30 A medical examiner's
28. See, e.g., Dugan v. Dieber, 32 A.D.2d 815, 302 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1969) (photograph de-
picting parking conditions improperly admitted because apartment buildings in photograph
had replaced private dwellings present at the time of the accident). Photographic inaccura-
cies usually result from differences in external conditions at the time the photograph is
taken. See People v. Vaiza, 244 Cal. App. 2d 121, 52 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1966) (photograph of
crime scene taken at 7:30 p.m. improperly admitted because the crime occurred at 2:00 a.m.
under different lighting conditions); People v. Schwing, 133 IlM App. 2d 100, 272 N.E.2d 779
(1971) (October photograph of the sun's reflection in a window properly excluded because
the material issue was whether the witness could have seen into the room in July, when the
sun's location would have caused a different reflection); Syrowik v. City of Detroit, 119
Mich. App. 343, 326 N.W.2d 507 (1982) (photographs of a hill where a minor fractured her
hip tobogganing properly excluded because they were taken during the summer).
Courts will not exclude photographic evidence, however, if the changed conditions are
immaterial to the case. See, e.g., Spilotro v. Hugi, 93 IMI- App. 3d 837, 417 N.E.2d 1066
(1981) (trial court improperly excluded photograph of a sick horse on the basis of a veteri-
narian's testimony that he could not recognize the horse from the photograph). The appel-
late court in Spilotro reasoned that the photograph was admissible because "it was not
offered as substantive evidence of the condition of the horse but merely as a model in order
to permit [the veterinarian] to more fully explain his observations of the animal during his
last examination of it." Id. at 842, 417 N.E.2d at 1070. See also Levenson v. Lake-to-Lake
Dairy Coop., 76 Ill. App. 3d 526, 394 N.E.2d 1359 (1979) (photograph of building, taken 30
to 45 minutes after an airplane crashed into it, admitted to establish weather conditions at
the time that the photograph was taken, not at the time of the crash); Taylor v. St. Louis-
S.F. Ry., 590 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (photographs showing a train approaching an
intersection not offered to show the motorist's view, but to show the general visibility of the
train's approach to the crossing where the accident occurred).
29. See, e.g, Saldana v. Wirtz Cartage Co., 74 Ill. 2d 379, 385 N.E.2d 664 (1978) (jury
cautioned that a motion picture depicting a construction truck in operation was a general
demonstration, not a reenactment of the accident); Twait v. Olson, 104 nM. App. 3d 191, 432
N.E.2d 1244 (1982) (photograph of a wrecked car taken after removal of its engine properly
admitted because counsel explained the removal to the jury).
30. See, e.g., Pressley v. State, 261 So. 2d 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (after a witness
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photographic exhibit depicting the wounds about which he is testi-
fying best illustrates this approach. Photographic displays allow an
examiner to illustrate wounds that are difficult to conceptualize,
such as numerous stab wounds, 1 multiple bruises, 2 or extensive
damage resulting from a gunshot wound. The pictorial testimony
theory does not limit photographic evidence to the conceptually
obscure wound, 4 although the need for photographic evidence is
diminished when a medical examiner can describe the wound ade-
quately without visual aids.3 5 Attorneys also frequently use photo-
graphic evidence to illustrate a witness' testimony about conditions
at the scene of an accident or crime. For example, photographic
evidence can illustrate a motorist's visual range at a railroad cross-
ing,36 the victim's position at a murder scene,3 7 or the location of
inanimate objects at a crime scene.3 8
Unlike the pictorial testimony theory, the silent witness theory
does not require witness authentication because the photographic
evidence is treated as self-authenticating." The photograph consti-
testified that robbers shot at a murder victim, court admitted a photograph of the victim
with his trouser pocket out because the photograph illustrated the justified inference that
the robbers took the victim's pistol during the incident); Houser v. Persinger, 57 Tenn. App.
401, 419 S.W.2d 179 (1967) (in a wrongful death action, the court admitted a photograph
showing the defendant's automobile in the position that the defendant claimed it was at the
time of the accident). See generally 3 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 790 (Chadbourn rev. ed.
1970).
31. See, e.g., Washington v. State, 415 So. 2d 1175 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982).
32. See, e.g., State v. Hawk, 292 N.W.2d 346 (S.D. 1980) (per curiam).
33. See, e.g., State v. Albers, 174 N.W.2d 649 (Iowa 1970).
34. See, e.g., People v. Kopp, 275 Cal. App. 2d 38, 79 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1969) (photograph
illustrated physician's testimony concerning a wound on the victim's lower lip); Johnson v.
State, 48 P.2d 969 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970) (photograph of victim's hemorrhaged eyes sup-
ported pathologist's testimony that asphyxiation caused death).
35. See People v. Jackson, 119 Mich. App. 138, 326 N.W.2d 392 (1982) (Maher, J., dis-
senting) (testimony of complainant and another witness that established an aggravated as-
sault obviated the need for photographs depicting the victim five days after the assault).
But see Jones v. State, 249 Ga. 605, 608, 293 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1982) ("We decline to adopt a
rule which would allow the admission of photographs only when they prove facts which
cannot be proved by testimony.").
36. See Maier v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 234 N.W.2d 388 (Iowa 1975).
37. See State v. Chase, 329 So. 2d 434, 436 (La. 1976).
38. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 210 Kan. 288, 502 P.2d 802 (1972); State v. Cox, 352
S.W.2d 665 (Mo. 1961).
39. "Even if direct testimony as to foundation matters is absent, however, the contents of
a photograph itself, together with such other circumstantial or indirect evidence as bears
upon the issue, may serve to explain and authenticate a photograph sufficiently to justify its
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tutes substantive evidence of a material issue independent of any
testimony. In practical terms, such photographic evidence assumes
greater significance than photographic evidence authenticated by
testimony. Instead of supplementing testimony on an issue, the
photographic evidence forms an independent basis upon which the
proponent may establish a fact or occurrence.40 Without the silent
witness rationale, courts would have to exclude photographic evi-
dence absent testimony authenticating the evidence. 41 The theory
thus enables prosecutors to initiate proceedings when photographic
exhibits represent the state's primary substantive evidence.42 Con-
sistent with their reluctance to limit the use of photographic evi-
dence, courts increasingly have admitted photographic evidence
under the silent witness theory when no witness can authenticate
the evidence. 43
admission into evidence." United States v. Stearns, 550 F.2d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 1977).
40. See id.; State v. Kasold, 110 Ariz. 558, 521 P.2d 990 (1974); Torres v. State, - Ind.
, 442 N.E.2d 1021 (1982); Bergner v. State, - Ind. App. , 397 N.E.2d 1012
(1979); State v. Holderness, 293 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1980); People v. Byrnes, 33 N.Y.2d 343,
308 N.E.2d 435, 352 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1974); State v. Kistle, 59 N.C. App. 724, 297 S.E.2d 626
(1982), petition denied, 307 N.C. 471, 298 S.E.2d 694 (1983).
41. There is no reason why a photograph or film, like an X-ray, may not, in a
proper case, be probative in itself. To hold otherwise would illogically limit the
use of a device whose memory is without question more accurate and reliable
than that of a human witness. It would exclude from evidence the chance pic-
ture of a crowd which on close examination shows the commission of a crime
that was not seen by the photographer at the time. It would exclude from evi-
dence pictures taken with a telescopic lens. It would exclude from evidence
pictures taken by a camera set to go off when a building's door is opened at
night.
People v. Bowley, 59 Cal. 2d 855, 861, 382 P.2d 591, 595, 31 Cal. Rptr. 471, 475 (1963). See
also Fisher v. State, 7 Ark. App. 1, 4-5, 643 S.W.2d 571, 571-74 (1982) (unwitnessed surveil-
lance videotapes of a robbery admitted under the silent witness theory because they "obvi-
ously" were not admissible under the pictorial testimony theory, as "no person could verify
that the videotape accurately represented what occurred at the store, based on personal
observation"); Murry v. State, 179 Ind. App. 305, 308, 385 N.E.2d 469, 472 (1979) (auto-
matic surveillance photographs of robbery inadmissible because the prosecution failed "to
establish that the photographs were true and accurate representations of ... the thing
which they intended to portray"; the prosecution could have authenticated the photographic
evidence through an alternate foundation based on camera operation and the development
process); State v. Kistle, 59 N.C. App. 724, 726, 297 S.E.2d 626, 627 (1982) ("Since the
photographs were introduced as evidence of the crime itself, and not as illustrative evidence,
there was no need to have a witness testify that they fairly and accurately represented the
scene described by testimony."), petition denied, 307 N.C. 471, 298 S.E.2d 694 (1983).
42. See supra note 40.
43. For thorough discussions of this trend, see Fisher v. State, 7 Ark. App. 1, 643 S.W.2d
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The use of photographic evidence from automatic surveillance
cameras is an example of this trend." When a witness observes a
crime while a surveillance camera records the event, the witness
authenticates the photographic evidence by testifying that it accu-
rately depicts the events of the crime. 45 One of the essential func-
tions of surveillance cameras, however, is to record unwitnessed
events." In United States v. Taylor,47 for example, the surveil-
lance camera had begun to film a robbery after robbers had locked
the bank personnel inside a vault. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit held that the motion picture was admis-
sible despite the absence of authentication by eyewitness testi-
mony. The court reasoned that the government had established an
alternate foundation for admission, including testimony about the
camera's installation and the film's chain of custody and
development.48
The Regiscope photographs that many stores use to match cus-
tomers' checks with their physical identities raise similar authenti-
571 (1982), State v. Holderness, 293 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1980), and Bergner v. State, -
Ind. App. , 397 N.E.2d 1012 (1979). Even courts in North Carolina, which consistently
admitted photographic evidence under the pictorial testimony theory only, now must admit
photographic evidence as substantive evidence. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-97 (Micliie Supp. 1983).
Before the North Carolina legislature enacted § 8-97, two cases presaged the demise of the
traditional North Carolina approach to photographic evidence. See State v. Hunt, 297 N.C.
447, 255 S.E.2d 182 (1979) (admitting photograph of shoe sole impression as substantive
evidence); State v. Foster, 284 N.C. 259, 200 S.E.2d 782 (1973) (admitting photographic
enlargements of fingerprints as substantive evidence). See generally Note, Photographic
Evidence: or, Is a Picture Really Worth a Thousand Words in North Carolina Court-
rooms?, 6 N.C. CENT. L.J. 349 (1975) (analyzing the development of the traditional North
Carolina approach to photographic evidence).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845
(1976); United States v. Pageau, 526 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Fisher v. State, 7 Ark.
App. 1, 643 S.W.2d 571 (1982); State v. Bunting, 187 N.J. Super. 506, 455 A.2d 531 (1983);
State v. Pulphus, - R.I. - , 465 A.2d 153 (1983).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Bynum, 567 F.2d 1167 (1st Cir. 1978); State v. Deering, 291
N.W.2d 38 (Iowa 1980).
46. See supra note 44.
47. 530 F.2d 639 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845 (1976).
48. 530 F.2d at 641-42. Other courts have admitted photographic evidence obtained
through surveillance cameras under the approach adopted by the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g.,
United States v. Pageau, 526 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Litton v. Commonwealth, 597
S.W.2d 616 (Ky. 1980); State v. Young, 303 A.2d 113 (Me. 1973); State v. Bunting, 187 N.J.
Super. 506, 455 A.2d 531 (1983); State v. Pulphus, - R.I. - , 465 A.2d 153 (1983).
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cation problems.49 Because the cashier rarely remembers taking a
particular customer's photograph, the proponent of the Regiscope
photograph must offer an alternate foundation for its admission.
Again, testimony regarding the reliability of the camera and the
photographic process generally suffices.50
If unwitnessed photographic evidence is the product of an ordi-
nary camera rather than sophisticated surveillance or Regiscope
equipment, courts should require a more stringent foundation be-
cause the photographic process is less reliable.5 1 Courts admit this
evidence, however, by allowing proponents to authenticate the
photographs through alternate foundations similar to those used to
authenticate automatic surveillance photographs.52 Nowhere is this
accommodation more apparent than with photographic evidence
used in the prosecution of various sexual offenders. These photo-
graphs typically are given to authorities by third parties5 or are
seized during lawful searches.A Consequently, the time, place, and
manner in which the photographs were made is often unclear. Nev-
ertheless, courts tend to admit these photographs despite their
weak evidentiary value if the proponent offers an alternate means
49. The Regiscope photograph is taken with a camera that has two lenses: one lens trans-
mits an image of the person cashing the check; the other lens transmits an image of the
check and the customer's identification. A single lever activates the camera, which makes
two pictures on the same negative. Sisk v. State, 236 Md. 589, 594, 204 A.2d 684, 686 (1964).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 531 F.2d 933 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 841
(1976); Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 745, 187 S.E.2d 189, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 861
(1972); State v. Tatum, 58 Wash. 2d 73, 360 P.2d 754 (1961).
51. For the defects associated with the ordinary camera, see infra notes 96-97 and accom-
panying text.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Stearns, 550 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (photographs authen-
ticated under rule 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence by testimony that the defendant
ordered and paid for the photographs and that, until seized, they were in possession of
persons in privity with the defendant; time and location of the photographs inferred from
their contents); State v. Holderness, 293 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1980) (photograph taken by In-
stamatic camera showing a person holding a stolen briefcase in which the camera had been
left was admitted on owner's testimony that the background in the photograph accurately
depicted his garage and boat, that he had a continued course of dealing with his film devel-
oper, that the camera produced reliable photographs, and that the prints accurately repro-
duced their negatives).
53. See e.g., Torres v. State, - Ind. . , 442 N.E.2d 1021 (1982); Bergner v. State,
- Ind. - 397 N.E.2d 1012 (1979); State v. Kistle, 59 N.C. App. 724, 297 S.E.2d 626
(1982), petition denied, 307 N.C. 471, 298 S.E.2d 694 (1983).
54. See, e.g., People v. Doggett, 83 Cal. App. 2d 405, 188 P.2d 792 (1948); People v.
Byrnes, 33 N.Y.2d 343, 308 N.E.2d 435, 352 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1974).
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of authentication."
The increasing tendency among courts to apply liberal authenti-
cation standards to photographic evidence shows growing judicial
reliance on the accuracy of photographic evidence. The conclusive
weight that courts sometimes accord this evidence emphasizes the
point. Courts have held that photographic evidence can demon-
strate physical facts so conclusively that it precludes consideration
of contrary testimony.56 These courts have found support for their
reasoning under the physical-fact rule, which impeaches evidence
that contradicts established scientific principles.57 A court should
not confuse a fact's photographic representation with the fact it-
self, however, in deciding that photographic evidence establishes
the fact conclusively under the physical-fact rule.5 8
The pictorial testimony theory also indicates that courts readily
accept the accuracy of photographic evidence.5 9 The authentication
standard under this theory allows courts to presume that a witness
remembers the details of a subject or scene well enough to verify a
photograph's accuracy. 0 In truth, however, most witnesses have
55. See, e.g., Torres v. State, - Ind. _ 442 N.E.2d 1021 (1982) (photographs admit-
ted in prosecution for child molestation on the basis of testimony identifying the defend-
ant's apartment as the background, and expert testimony negating alteration); People v.
Byrnes, 33 N.Y.2d 343, 308 N.E.2d 435, 352 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1974) (photographs admitted in
prosecution for rape, sodomy, and incest on the basis of testimony identifying the defendant
and expert testimony negating alteration); State v. Kistle, 59 N.C. App. 724, 297 S.E.2d 626
(1982), petition denied, 307 N.C. 471, 298 S.E.2d 694 (1983) (photographs admitted in pros-
ecution for taking indecent liberties with a child on the basis of the film processor's testi-
mony that he processed the photographs, and testimony by another witness that the defend-
ant delivered the undeveloped film for processing).
56. See, e.g., Zide v. Jewell Tea Co., 39 IlL App. 2d 217, 188 N.E.2d 383 (1963); New
Orleans & Northeastern R.R. v. Burney, 248 Miss. 290, 159 So. 2d 85 (1963); Black v. Kan-
sas City S. Ry., 436 S.W.2d 19 (Mo. 1968) (en banc).
57. See 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 662 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979).
58. Courts also cannot apply the physical-fact rule when the photographic evidence does
not support a conclusive determination. See, e.g., Sprick v. North Shore Hosp., 121 So. 2d
682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (photograph of the view from a nurse's chair in a hospital
nursery was not conclusive of her ability to see a crib in the back row of cribs where a baby
allegedly was left unattended), cert. denied, 123 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1960); Grove v. Taulbee,
350 S.W.2d 620 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961) (photographs depicting location of a pickup truck and a
coal truck after they collided did not conclusively establish the position of each on impact);
Fallon v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 444 Pa. 148, 279 A.2d 164 (1971) (photographs of a motor-
ist's view of an approaching train inconclusive).
59. See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
60. See id.
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imperfect memories.1 Nonetheless, by liberally admitting photo-
graphic evidence, courts implicitly have accorded substantial faith
to the reliability of the photographic process.62
Most jurisdictions allow the jury to determine the weight that a
photographic exhibit deserves.63 Courts often have held that uncer-
tainty over photographic evidence is relevant to the weight of the
evidence, rather than its admissibility." Moreover, many jurisdic-
tions prohibit judges from instructing juries on the weight of evi-
dence. Given the jury's duty to resolve matters of evidentiary
weight, and the increasing use of photographic evidence, the relia-
bility of photographic evidence is decisively important.
CATEGORIES AND PROBLEMS OF PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE
Photographs
Despite their increasing reliance on photographic evidence,
courts fail to recognize the special problems associated with its use.
Because factfinders should rely on photographic evidence only to
the extent justified by its evidentiary value, they must consider the
various factors that diminish its evidentiary value. A photograph's
evidentiary value may be diminished in two ways. First, the pho-
tographer can distort a photograph and mislead the factfinder with
a deceptive representation of the photograph's subject. Second, the
photograph can influence the factfinder improperly, regardless of
the technical accuracy of its representation. Improper influence di-
minishes the evidentiary value of photographs by evoking emo-
61. But see State v. Pulphus, - R.I. _, 465 A.2d 153, 161 (1983) ("We have always
allowed witnesses with less than perfect eyesight to testify to what they recalled seeing, even
after the eroding effect of the passage of time has advanced the process of forgetting.").
62. 2 C. ScoTr, supra note 3, § 1026.
63. See, e.g., Baird v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry., 315 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1963); State v.
Fournier, 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 588, 203 A.2d 245 (1964); Litton v. Commonwealth, 597 S.W.2d
616 (Ky. 1980); Smith v. State, 659 P.2d 330 (Okl. Crim. App. 1983); cf. Alleman v. State
Dept. of Highways, 416 So. 2d 272 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (determining the weight of photo-
graphic evidence is within the trial court's discretion as factfinder).
64. See, e.g., Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, 697 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Clayton, 643 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1981); Sloan v. State, - Ind. _ 408 N.E.2d 1264
(1980); State v. Shipman, 568 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Wenzel v. Rollins Motor Co.,
598 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
65. See K. REDDEN & S. SALTZURG, FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE MJANUAL 27-28 (1975);
see also 3 C. Scorr, supra note 3, § 1562.
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tional responses instead of rational ones, and causes the factfinder
to give the photographic evidence more weight than it deserves.
Photographic Deception
Photographic deception receives less attention than it deserves.
Contrary to popular belief, photography remains an inexact sci-
ence; photographs can and do lie.6 A photograph can distort a
subject through the interplay of many variables. Lens type, camera
position or perspective, lighting, film type and speed, lens filters,
camera quality, length of exposure, and the development process
can create distortion.67 For several reasons, the greatest potential
for distortion arises from the first two variables-lens type and
camera position or perspective.6 8
Both variables present practical problems. The possibility of de-
ception through lens variation and camera position arises whenever
a photographer takes a photograph.69 Neither possibility depends
on conscious deception.7 0 Because those who view a photograph
usually are unfamiliar with the subject's details, they also cannot
perceive misleading results produced by lens variation and camera
position.7 1
Lens variations can produce strikingly different results even if
the photographer takes the photographs from the same position.
66. [P]hotographs have received a public acceptation for extreme accuracy and
verity which is excessive under the facts. It is demonstrably true that pictures
may be made to lie. And [it is also true] that many types of entirely unplanned
misrepresentations are the natural product of the nature of the photographic
process, which makes inaccuracies inevitable.... It does not detract from the
extreme usefulness of photographic evidence to discount such statements as
"pictures don't lie," nor to disown as question-begging inanity "a picture is
worth ten-thousand words."
K. HUGHES & B. CANTOR, PHOTOGRAPHS IN CwIL LITIGATION 39 (1973).
67. See generally C. SCOTT, supra note 3, §§ 151-581.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 72-86.
69. See id.
70. Variations in lenses and camera position can be inadvertent. Other variables, such as
changes in lighting, can create deceptive images that are even less likely to result from con-
scious deception. Indeed, photographic deception probably is due more to ignorance of the
variables that affect photographic quality than to conscious manipulation of the photo-
graphic process. See Heilpern & Schatz, Responsibilities of the Legal Profession to the Fo-
rensic Sciences: Responsibilities of the Courtroom Photographer, 6 J. FORENSIC SCI. 207,
207-08 (1961).
71. See infra text accompanying notes 77-78.
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This phenomenon occurs because every lens has a specific focal
length. The focal length is the distance between the surface of the
film and the point near the lens at which the incoming light rays
converge to form an image.72 Lenses with long focal lengths tend to
shorten lines, narrow the width of an area, and make objects ap-
pear closer.73 These lenses are called telephoto or long focus
lenses. 4 Conversely, lenses with short focal lengths tend to elon-
gate lines, broaden the width of an area, and make objects appear
farther away.75 Photographers refer to these lenses as wide-angle or
short focus lenses.7 6
The danger of distortion due to lens variation is present in pho-
tographs of any subject. The danger is most significant, however,
with photographs of places and objects. A photographic expert can
detect distortion in photographs taken through telephoto or wide-
angle lenses, but the average person cannot.7 7 A layman may detect
the distortion if the subject of the photograph is a human figure
because people know how a human figure should look. 8 The aver-
age person unfamiliar with an object or place that is the subject of
a photograph, however, has no preconceived idea of the subject's
appearance. As diverse as the appearance of human beings may be,
the appearance of places and objects is infinitely more variable.
The likelihood of undetected photographic distortion, therefore, is
much higher.
Photographs in railroad crossing cases exemplify the potential
for deceptive representation of a place. Topography, foliage, and
the angle of the intersection all add to the distinctive appearance
of any crossing79 When the automobile driver's field of view is dis-
puted, the jurors resolve the issue on the basis of photographs of a
72. See C. ScoTr, supra note 3, § 76.
73. Id. 88 156, 182, 202, 222, 244, 290, 308.
74. Id. § 76.
75. Id. 88 156, 182, 202, 222, 244, 290, 308. Zoom lenses, which became popular during the
1970's, are capable of both telephoto and wide-angle photography because their focal
lengths are variable. Id. § 76.
76. Id. § 76.
77. See Heilpern & Schatz, supra note 70, at 211.
78. See C. ScoTt, supra note 3, §§ 308, 575.
79. Cf. Johnson v. State, 636 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1981) (photographs of 45 railroad crossings
in the Portland, Oregon area held properly excluded for insufficient similarity to the cross-
ing where the accident occurred).
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scene that they probably have not observed and for which they
have no standard of reference. The possibilities for distortion,
therefore, abound. Suppose, for example, that the outcome of a
case depended on whether a motorist was contributorily negligent
in failing to heed a warning sign at a railroad crossing, and the
location of the sign was disputed. A photograph taken with a tele-
photo lens from a distant viewpoint would make the sign appear
much closer to the crossing than it actually was.80 A photograph
taken with a wide-angle lens from a close viewpoint would have the
opposite effect, suggesting that the sign was much farther from the
crossing than it actually was.81 In either case, the lens type would
combine with the camera position to distort the distance between
the sign and the crossing, which could affect the jury's determina-
tion of the motorist's contributory negligence.
Camera position presents a further threat to photographic accu-
racy because it can cause distortion even if the lens does not dis-
tort the photograph.8 2 As with lens variation, variation in camera
position affects the perspective of a photograph. 83 Suppose the is-
sue of the motorist's contributory negligence in the previous exam-
ple depended on his ability to see a train approaching the crossing.
Assume also that trees and brush are situated to the south of the
crossing, the direction from which the train approached. A photo-
graph taken from just above ground level would depict an obscured
view; a photograph taken several feet higher, however, would show
much better visibility." A photograph depicting an accurate per-
80. This effect occurs because telephoto lenses have long focal lengths. See supra note 73
and accompanying text.
81. This effect occurs because wide-angle lenses have short focal lengths. See supra note
75 and accompanying text.
82. See C. Scorr, supra note 3, § 80. An early case noted the potential for this type of
deception: "It is a matter of almost common knowledge that photographs may be taken
from different angles so as to exaggerate certain distances, or, on the other hand, to make
space more compact. . . ." Puleo v. Stanislaw Holding Corp., 126 Misc. 372, 372, 213 N.Y.S.
601, 602 (1926).
83. Perspective is the depiction of objects on a plane surface in such a manner that the
impression approximates the relative positions of the objects as they would appear to a
person at a given point. C. Scor, supra note 3, § 80.
84. See Silvey v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 445 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. 1969) (both plaintiff trucker's
photographs and defendant railroad's photographs excluded because the trucker's photo-
graphs showed considerable obstruction by trees, and photographs taken by the railroad
company showed a less obscured view, but appeared as though the camera was positioned
[Vol. 25:705
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spective would have to be taken from the position of the motorist's
eyes as he approached the crossing. 5 Any photographic evidence
offered to prove visibility should be from such a position.8
Other variables that affect a photograph's accuracy are neverthe-
less noteworthy. Lighting, for example, can make a subject appear
either lighter or darker than it was at the time in issue. Courts
generally recognize this possibility and exclude misleading photo-
graphs unless the changed lighting conditions are obvious or irrele-
vant. 7 Courts do exclude photographs taken under different light-
ing conditions if offered to prove visibility.8 Because photographs
taken under different lighting conditions are not misleading when
offered to show the general conditions of a scene, however, courts
generally admit them if the jury is aware of the altered lighting
conditions.89
Subtle changes in the lighting of scenes can produce significant
differences in certain types of photographs, such as photographs of
above some trees and brush that obscured the plaintiff's photos).
85. See, e.g., Zumault v. Wabash Ry., 302 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. 1957).
86. See, e.g., Coyner Crop Dusters v. Marsh, 91 Ariz. 371, 379 n.6, 372 P.2d 708, 714 n.6
(1962) (en banc); Stone v. Northern Pac. Ry., 29 N.D. 480, 151 N.W. 36 (1915).
87. See Avery v. Scott, 216 So. 2d 111, 113 (La. Ct. App. 1968) (photographs and motion
pictures taken at approximately the same time of year as the accident and offered to show
the lighting at the time of the accident properly excluded because of "the susceptibility of
error or manipulation in the photographic process to either increase or decrease the dark-
ness of the photo negative and thus produce a misleading picture"), cert. denied, 253 La.
313, 217 So. 2d 410 (1969); see also Sparks v. State, 242 So. 2d 403 (Ala. Crim. App. 1970)
(night photograph of robbery scene offered to show lighting conditions at the time of the
nighttime robbery excluded), cert. denied, 286 Ala. 738, 242 So. 2d 408, cert. denied, 402
U.S. 909 (1971); State v. McNew, 353 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1962) (night photograph properly
excluded because offered to show that a witness was unable to see the nighttime attack);
Fox v. City of Kansas City, 343 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960) ("It is recognized by
science and legal authority that when a casualty occurs at night it is doubtful that lighting
conditions can be reproduced photographically as they appeared to the participant.").
88. See supra note 87.
89. See, e.g., Morales v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 246 So. 2d 52 (La. Ct. App. 1971)
(photograph of scene where a taxicab hit a pedestrian at night admissible although taken
during the day because the policeman who took the photograph testified that he intended to
show the general surroundings and not to portray actual lighting conditions), cert. deniid,
258 La. 772, 247 So. 2d 867 (1972); State v. McNew, 353 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1962) (photograph
of nighttime manslaughter scene taken during the day admissible because jury was aware of
when the photograph was taken); State v. Hackney, 261 N.W.2d 419 (S.D. 1978) (photo-
graph of motorcycle accident scene taken the morning after a 7:30 p.m. accident admissible
to show the conditions of the scene because the deputy who took the photograph explained
changes in the scene, including altered lighting conditions).
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holes and depressions. 90 Courts should recognize, therefore, that
changes in lighting can affect an object's apparent dimensions or
depth. Insufficient lighting minimizes the dimension of an object or
the depth of a hole, for example, whereas enhanced lighting em-
phasizes both dimension and depth.91
Variations in film and lens filters present fewer possibilities for
distortion. These variations can be used to accentuate or to mini-
mize contrasts, making wounds appear deeper or shallower than
they actually are. 2 Because only black-and-white photographs are
subject to this type of distortion,93 the increasing use of color pho-
tography has reduced the potential for distortion. Color photo-
graphs are less subject to distortion by filters and generally portray
their subjects more accurately than comparable black-and-white
photographs.9 '
Similarly, because photographers can purchase reliable cameras
at economical prices, problems caused by camera quality have de-
90. See C. Scorr, supra note 3, § 204.
91. Id.
92. See id., §§ 91, 574.
93. Color photographs are not subject to contrast exaggeration or minimization because
contrast filters, which cause this distortion, cannot be used with color film without obviously
distorting the results. 2 C. ScoTT, supra note 3, § 752.
94. Contrary to general understanding color is the one attribute of most ordinary
subjects that can be nearly reproduced rather than merely represented photo-
graphically. Whether in black-and-white or in color, a photograph can only
suggest the forms and shapes of solid objects, their relative sizes, and the dis-
tances between them, but if it is taken on the right type of color film and is
properly exposed and correctly developed, a picture can so nearly reproduce
the colors of the subject that it appears natural. Therefore, good color pictures
are suitable for almost every evidential purpose except those requiring the ex-
act matching of colors....
... It is true that a color photograph cannot reproduce colors exactly but it
can come so close to doing so that it can safely be said that of all the attributes
of a solid object that can be represented photographically, color is the only
attribute that can be almost correct. Therefore a good color photograph is su-
perior to a black-and-white picture for almost every evidential subject except
those in which color is not important or not involved.
3 C. ScoTr, supra note 3, § 1353.
Courts also recognize the superiority of color photographs. See, e.g., Wilkins v. State, 155
So. 2d 129, 131 (Fla. 1963); Sotelo v. State, 264 Ind. 298, 307, 342 N.E.2d 844, 850 (1976);
State v. Hayward, 114 N.H. 792, 794, 330 A.2d 445, 446 (1974). A legitimate objection arises,
however, when a photograph's color rendition arguably is erroneous and prejudicial.
See infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
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creased. 5 Although the reliability of any camera varies with the
particular photographic situation, only inexpensive box cameras9
are inherently deceptive. The drawback of box cameras lies prima-
rily in their unsophisticated lenses, which are subject to every
identifiable lens defect.9 7 Nevertheless, many courts admit snap-
shots taken with inferior cameras.9 Judicial unwillingness to re-
strict the use of photographic evidence probably explains this
tendency.99
Improper exposure 00 is another insignificant source of distor-
tion. Improper exposure may produce a misleading photograph if
matters of detail, tone, or contrast are important.101 Overexposed
and underexposed photographs are conspicuous, however, and
courts generally exclude them as misleading 0 2 or admit them sub-
ject to the jury's discretion regarding weight.103
Reversing the photographic negative during the development
process presents a subtle danger of deception. Reversing the nega-
tive reverses the right and left sides of a photograph, and produces
95. Traditionally, the more reliable cameras were bulky and expensive. Perhaps the most
reliable camera for evidentiary purposes, the view camera is unwieldy because it is designed
for use on a tripod. C. Scorr, supra note 3, § 124. Similarly, the technical camera, which
combines the precision of the view camera with the compactness of smaller cameras, is too
expensive for general use. Id. § 125. The advent of smaller cameras that are generally relia-
ble, particularly 35-millimeter cameras, has diminished problems of bulk and expense. Id.
§ 128. The superiority of 35-millimeter cameras in color photography makes them an even
greater asset to the forensic photographer. Id. Instamatic cameras also are convenient and
economical, but their reliability varies greatly. Id. §§ 129, 130.
96. A box camera is "[a] relatively simple camera of box shape usually equipped with a
mediocre lens but often provided with automatic photo-electric exposure control for
daylight and synchronization for flashbulbs." 3 id. at 442.
97. 1 id. § 75. The principal lens defects include spherical aberration, coma, astigmatism,
curvature of field, distortion, chromatic aberration, and chromatic difference of magnifica-
tion. Id. § 74.
98. See, e.g., People v. Vandiver, 51 Ill. 2d 525, 283 N.E.2d 681 (1971); State v. Young, 87
Wash. 2d 129, 550 P.2d 1 (1976) (en banc).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 56-62.
100. Exposure depends on the amount of light that strikes the film thereby producing the
negative. Too little light produces an underexposed negative; too much light produces an
overexposed negative. C. ScoTr, supra note 3, § 94.
101. Underexposed photographs will cause a loss of detail, shadowy tones, and dull con-
trasts; overexposed photographs also will cause a loss of detail and dull contrasts, but tones
are typically pale. Id. §§ 96-98.
102. See Stormont v. New York Cent. R.R., 1 Ohio App. 2d 414, 205 N.E.2d 74 (1964).
103. See Howell v. Muscogee County, 105 Ga. App. 515, 125 S.E.2d 139 (1962).
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a clear but deceptive print.'"' Deception by reversing the negative
occurs infrequently and is probably inadvertent. If it occurs, how-
ever, the photograph should be excluded. 10
5
Retouching0" constitutes the final form of photographic distor-
tion. Retouching is potentially the most blatant form of deception,
but is also the most infrequent. 07 Judicial decisions reveal few in-
stances of such intentional distortion. 08 Indeed, courts appear to
have adopted tacitly the presumption that photographs have not
been retouched. 09 If a photograph has been retouched before a
lawsuit is filed, the retouching is not considered an intentional dis-
tortion, and courts will admit the photograph if the proponent lays
a foundation showing that the photograph accurately represents its
subject."0
In addition to technical qualities affecting the accuracy of photo-
graphic evidence, viewers also make perception errors. A catalogue
of optical illusions is unnecessary to establish that one image may
convey different ideas to different people."' Perceptual error re-
sults not so much from defects in the human optical system as
from the process through which the mind interprets visual stim-
uli. 1 2 The mind interprets stimuli according to past experiences 1 3
104. 2 C. Scorr, supra note 3, §1051; see also 1 id. § 291.
105. State v. Newman, 162 Mont. 450, 461, 513 P.2d 258, 264 (1973) (photograph printed
from an inadvertently reversed negative "obviously inadmissible").
106. Retouching is "the alteration of the photographic image, negative or positive, by
means of handwork usually done with a pencil, pen, brush, airbrush or etching knife." 2 C.
Scorr, supra note 3, § 1050.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. Such a presumption follows from the rule that a photograph need be authenticated
only by a witness who is familiar with the subject rather than by the photographer or devel-
oper who prepared the photograph. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text; see also
State v. Kennedy, 135 N.J. Super. 513, 343 A.2d 783 (1975) (counsel need not call the pho-
tographer if another witness testifies that the photograph is accurate).
110. See, e.g., Boyd v. State, 50 Ala. App. 394, 279 So. 2d 565 (1973); Department of
Public Works & Bldga. v. Hall, 30 11. App. 3d 831, 333 N.E.2d 701 (1975); Lawson v. Darter,
157 Va. 284, 160 S.E. 74 (1931).
111. See J. MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT, 9-25 (2d ed. 1980).
112. Id. at 10-12; see also Gregory, Visual Illusions, SCI. Am., Nov. 1968, at 66 (analyzing
various optical illusions as manifestations of the human information-processing mechanism).
113. For example, when researchers place a person in a room with no standard of refer-
ence and show the person a playing card twice the size of a standard one, the person will
assume that the playing card is twice as close as it actually is, rather than assume that the
playing card is twice as large. See Kilpatrick & Cantril, The Constancies in Social Percep-
[Vol. 25:705
1984] PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE
and prejudices,114 both of which are unique to the individual. Be-
cause of this subjective perception process, jurors can misinterpret
the contents of an undistorted photograph. 115
Improper Influence
If a photograph improperly influences the viewer, the influence
impairs the photograph's evidentiary value although the photo-
graph may be technically accurate. This problem normally arises
when the proponent offers into evidence gruesome photographs of
corpses or injured persons." 6 The problem of determining the
tion, in EXPLORATIONS IN TRANSACTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 354 (F. Kilpatrick ed. 1961). The per-
son's past experiences create an expectation that the playing card is a certain size, and this
expectation shapes his perception of the enlarged card. Id. Marshall also describes the
phenomenon:
It is the premise of the transactional psychologists that man's basic drive is
toward security, not only in the emotional sense but in terms of being in har-
mony with his environment. The greater the constancy of that environment,
the higher the degree of security that it will yield. Change of environment re-
quires a re-evaluation of the external world so that the individual, trying to
regain his security, can realign himself with those persons or things or happen-
ings external to him. Man's perceptions are guided by this need to maintain
psychological equilibrium. To insure a predictable environment, perception can
magnify or diminish the importance of certain information, and actually dis-
tort quality and size.
J. MARSHALL, supra note 111, at 10-11 (footnote omitted).
114. In one study, researchers showed subjects a picture of a white man confronting a
black man in a subway train. Although the white man held a razor, over half the subjects
asserted that the black man held it. G. ALLPORT & L. PosTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR
(1947).
115. A photograph to some extent gives us an image as it would be reflected on the
retina before it is transmitted to the recording and interpreting centers in the
brain. Therefore, if there are errors in perception to be considered in connec-
tion with photographic evidence they come into being only when a witness, a
judge, an attorney, or a juror looks at the picture and are not in any way faults
of the photograph itself.
C. SCOTT, supra note 3, § 48.
Similar perception problems have been raised with respect to the reliability of eyewitness
testimony. See, e.g., J. MARSHALL, supra note 111; Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, Sc.
Am., Dec. 1974, at 23; Doyle, Applying Lawyers' Expertise to Scientific Experts: Some
Thoughts About Trial Court Analysis of the Prejudicial Effects of Admitting and Exclud-
ing Expert Scientific Testimony, 25 WM. & MaRY L. REV. 619, 623 n.19 (1984).
116. The cases describe such gruesome photographs in a variety of ways. See 3 C. Scorr,
supra note 3, § 1231 (2d ed. & Supp. 1980).
Improper influence can result from photographs of other subjects as welL See, e.g., Mar-
ile v. Spiegel, 213 Neb. 223, 329 N.W.2d 80 (1983) (family photograph).
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weight that the factfinder should give to this photographic evi-
dence implicitly centers on the admissibility decision.
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,117 which codifies the
common law rule,1 8 provides that relevant evidence "may be ex-
cluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice." After balancing probative value
against possible prejudice, however, courts that admit photographs
into evidence do not eliminate or even diminish the prejudicial im-
pact of the photographs. Gruesome photographs, therefore, con-
tinue to have a prejudicial impact.1" 9 Despite this fact, courts gen-
erally admit gruesome photographs whenever the proponent can
show the photographs' relevance to a material issue.120 Ordinarily,
demonstrating relevance is a perfunctory matter. Courts admit
gruesome photographs for a variety of purposes, allowing the pro-
ponent to prove corpus delicti,' 2' identify a victim, 22 show the lo-
117. FED. R. Evm. 403.
118. See K. REDDEN & S. SALrZBURG, supra note 65, at 101 (3d ed. 1982). The drafters of
the Federal Rules of Evidence designed rule 403 to ensure that decisions are based on ra-
tional, rather than emotional responses. Commonwealth v. Batty, 482 Pa. 173, 177, 393 A.2d
435, 437 (1978) ("This evidentiary rule is not designed to protect an accused from the per se
use of photographs of a victim of a homicide; its purpose is to protect an accused from a
conviction based upon a jury's emotional reaction, rather than a careful deliberation of the
facts of the case."); see also State v. Beers, 8 Ariz. App. 534, 539, 448 P.2d 104, 109 (1968)
(photographs of murdered child showing massive bruises, coupled with prosecutor's rhetoric,
"may have inflamed the jury into acting out of passion rather than logic"); State v. Banks,
564 S.W.2d 947, 952 (Tenn. 1978) (responding to the prosecution's argument that photo-
graphs of the murder victim's battered head and body were relevant to the degree of pun-
ishment, the court stated: "Shocking and horrifying the jury emotionally does not assist
them in making a reasoned determination of how serious the crime is, how much deterrence
is necessary to prevent like crimes in the future, or what danger the defendant poses to
society.").
119. The admission of prejudicial photographs can lead to the infliction of excessive pun-
ishment. In State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d 947 (Tenn. 1978), for example, the jury recom-
mended the death penalty rather than a life sentence, primarily because of gruesome photo-
graphs of the victim. Photographs, however, can serve a legitimate function in the
sentencing process. See Foster v. State, 369 So. 2d 928 (Fla) (photograph introduced during
sentencing hearing showed that defendant delivered a blow with a knife sufficient to sever
the incapacitated victim's spinal cord, thus constituting one of the aggravating circum-
stances justifying the death penalty), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979).
120. See, e.g., Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Van Haden, 416 So. 2d 699 (Ala. 1982); Robinson v.
F.W. Woolworth & Co., 420 So. 2d 737 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
121. See, e.g., Peacock v. State, 231 Ga. 644, 203 S.E.2d 533 (1974); Collins v. State, 506
S.W.2d 179 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
122. State v. Jackson, 200 Neb. 827, 265 N.W.2d 850 (1978); Scott v. State, 92 Nev. 552,
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cation and extent of wounds, 123 show the atrociousness of the
crime, 12" corroborate and clarify a witness' testimony or the prose-
cution's theory of the crime, 2 5 illustrate expert testimony about
the victim's wounds, 2 6 refute a claim of self-defense,1 27 or shed
light on such subjective matters as intent, malice, or
premeditation.1 28
Opponents typically do not dispute the accuracy of gruesome
photographs. In the event of a dispute, claims of color distortion
represent the most likely challenge. In Faught v. Washam,1 29 for
example, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the trial court im-
properly admitted photographs of a victim's injured thigh and foot
because the injuries were "not portrayed in their natural color,"
but rather in "'high and unrealistic colors.' ,,,13 More often, dis-
crepancies arise from the color of bruises in photographs and testi-
mony describing the bruises. ' These discrepancies, however, usu-
554 P.2d 735 (1976); cf. People v. Harris, 38 I. 2d 552, 232 N.E.2d 721 (1967) (photograph
admitted to show the difficulty of visual identification).
123. See, e.g., Floyd v. State, 233 Ga. 280, 210 S.E.2d 810 (1974), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
949 (1977); McCurdy v. State, 263 Ind. 66, 324 N.E.2d 489 (1975); State v. Love, 546 S.W.2d
441 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); State v. Robinson, 185 Neb. 64, 173 N.W.2d 443 (1970).
124. See, e.g., Hulsey v. State, 549 S.W.2d 73 (Ark. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
882 (1978); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 378 Mass. 680, 393 N.E.2d 820 (1979).
125. See, e.g., People v. Slone, 76 Cal. App. 3d 611, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61, 74 (1978) (prosecu-
tion theory); Teal v. State, 122 Ga. App. 532, 177 S.E.2d 840, 841 (1970) (witness testi-
mony); People v. Dagge, 10 Ill. App. 3d 726, 295 N.E.2d 336 (1973) (witness testimony);
State v. Conklin, 54 N.J. 540, 258 A.2d 1 (1969) (prosecution theory).
126. Pilon v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 228 (Ky. 1976); State v. Oveross, 18 Or. App.
300, 525 P.2d 176 (1974); Cagle v. State, 507 S.W.2d 121 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977).
127. See, e.g., Henninger v. State, 251 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1971); State v. Sawyer, 350 So. 2d
611 (La. 1977); People v. Banks, 50 Mich. App. 622, 213 N.W.2d 817 (1973); Suggs v. State,
509 P.2d 1374 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
128. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 338 So. 2d 524 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976); People v. Jentry,
69 Cal. App. 3d 615, 138 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1977); People v. Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 132
Cal. Rptr. 265 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 986 (1977); People v. Gill, 31 Mich. App. 395,
187 N.W.2d 707 (1971); State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342 (Tenn. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 770 (1983); Brown v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 515, 184 S.E.2d 786 (1971), cert. denied,
408 U.S. 940 (1972).
129. 329 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. 1959).
130. Id. at 600. The court concluded that the photographs' "probable inflammatory and
prejudicial effect far outweighed their potential evidentiary or probative value ..... Id.
131. See, e.g., Seyle v. State, 584 P.2d 1081 (Wyo. 1978); cf. Sage v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 783,
275 N.W.2d 705 (1979) (photographs admitted to show bruises although some of the discol-
oration depicted in the photographs may not have resulted from the crime).
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ally do not prevent the admission of photographs."3 2
Courts often have ignored the defendant's objections to grue-
some photographs by focusing on the nature of the defendant's al-
leged act, rather than the capacity of the photographs to influence
the jury improperly.133 Especially in the criminal context, a stan-
dard reply to an objection based on the prejudicial nature of a
gruesome photograph has been that the accused has no right to
complain about offensive photographic evidence because the ac-
cused committed the gruesome act or because the crime is inher-
ently gruesome.1l These replies do not respond to the prejudice
problem, however, and may threaten constitutional safeguards.13 5
Courts sometimes justify admitting gruesome photographs by
analogizing to verbal testimony. Because courts do not exclude
forceful oral testimony, they reason that they cannot exclude force-
ful photographic evidence.3" This reasoning is specious, however,
because fundamental differences exist between oral and photo-
graphic evidence. Jurors are more likely to believe physical evi-
dence than oral testimony.13 7 The potential prejudice of photo-
132. See supra note 131.
133. See, e.g., State v. Seehan, 258 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Iowa 1977) ("Evidence of this nature
tends to be gruesome because murder is gruesome."); State v. Burnfin, 606 S.W.2d 629, 630
(Mo. 1980) ("Insofar as Exhibit 11 tends to be shocking or gruesome it is because the crime
is one of that sort."); State v. Johnson, 25 Utah 2d 46, 50, 475 P.2d 543, 546 (1970) ("There
is some sort of paradox involved where one commits a heinous act and then complains that
the very sight of what he has done is so revolting to the sensibilities of [the jurors] that it
would so distort their judgment that they could not fairly determine his guilt or innocence
of crime."); State v. Jackson, 22 Utah 2d 408, 410, 454 P.2d 290, 291 (1969) ("If an accused
does not wish the jury to see the blood which his criminal hand has caused to flow, then he
should choose some method other than bloodshedding to commit his murder."). This rea-
soning appears to presume guilt, at least when directed against the accused, thus ignoring
due process and the presumption of innocence.
134. See supra note 133.
135. See id.
136. [I]f a Thomas Gray, a William Shakespeare or an Edgar Allan Poe had wit-
nessed the accident, their descriptions of it would as aptly and inflammatorily
have described [the victim's] condition as do the pictures in this record. And
while appellants would agree that the eloquence of a Gray, a Shakespeare or a
Poe would not help their cause, we do not believe that they would argue that
their word description would not be legitimate or proper to go to the jury.
Consequently. we do not find the pictures, which show what words would have
described, to have been improperly admitted.
Reed v. McGibboney, 243 Ark. 789, 791-92, 422 S.W.2d 115, 117 (1967).
137. A recognition that physical evidence is inherently more credible than oral testimony
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graphic evidence, therefore, is enhanced.
Other courts have attempted to dismiss the problem of gruesome
photographs by emphasizing the jurors' ability to evaluate the pho-
tographs properly.13 Courts taking this approach suggest that
gruesome photographs will not influence jurors unfairly because ju-
rors are more detached, experienced, and unimpressionable than
the legal profession normally assumes. 139 This approach, however,
fails to recognize that people naturally respond to gruesome photo-
graphs with revulsion.140 Jurors rarely observe the type of wounds
and injuries typically portrayed in gruesome photographs. Realisti-
cally, corpses clothed in bloody garments and partially decomposed
bodies are not part of the average person's everyday experience.14 1
Motion Pictures
Courts generally subject motion pictures 42 to the same admissi-
serves as the point of departure for several recent articles on demonstrative evidence. See,
e.g., Belli, Demonstrative Evidence: Seeing is Believing, TRIAL, July 1980, at 70; Heffernan,
Effective Use of Demonstrative Evidence: "Seeing Is Believing", 5 Am. J. TRA ADvoc. 427
(1982); Babcok, Higgins & Witke, A Video Tape Is Worth a Thousand Words: The Use of
Demonstrative Evidence in the Defense of an Automobile Products Liability Case, 50 INs.
CouNs. J. 94 (1983).
138. A juror is not some kind of a dithering nincompoop, brought in from never-
never land and exposed to the harsh realities of life for the first time in the
jury box. There is nothing magic about being a member of the bench or bar
which makes these individuals capable of dispassionately evaluating gruesome
testimony which, it is often contended, will throw jurors into a paroxysm of
hysteria. Jurors are our peers, often as well educated, as well balanced, as sta-
ble, as experienced in the realities of life as the holders of law degrees. The
average juror is well able to stomach the unpleasantness of exposure to the
facts of a murder without being unduly influenced. The supposed influence on
jurors of allegedly gruesome or inflammatory pictures exists more in the imagi-
nation of judges and lawyers than in reality.
People v. Long, 38 Cal. App. 3d 680, 689, 113 Cal. Rptr. 530, 536-37 (1974). See also State v.
Duguay, 158 Me. 61, 178 A.2d 129 (1962).
139. See supra note 138.
140. Indeed, even judges typically characterize the photographs in unreserved terms. See
supra note 116.
141. The revolting nature of gruesome photographs is apparent in numerous cases. See,
e.g., United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862 (1979);
Stevens v. State, 443 P.2d 600 (Alaska 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1039 (1969); State v.
Morales, 120 Ariz. 517, 587 P.2d 236 (1978); State v. Needs, 99 Idaho 883, 591 P.2d 130
(1979); State v. Sledge, 297 N.C. 227, 254 S.E.2d 579 (1979); Luck v. State, 588 S.W.2d 371
(Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 944 (1980).
142. Motion pictures are made by joining numerous photographs. See 2 C. ScoTr, supra
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bility standard as photographs. A motion picture must be relevant
to a material issue and properly authenticated to be admissible. 143
A motion picture's portrayal of a visual image differs significantly
from a photograph's portrayal of a visual image. The special attrib-
utes of film presentation-action, lifelikeness, and susceptibility to
manipulation-present unique problems regarding'the motion pic-
ture's evidentiary value.144 Advocates typically use motion pictures
to reenact an event 45 or refute a disability claim by secretly film-
ing a person performing activities inconsistent with the claimed
disability.1 46
Reenactments
Courts admit reenactments as long as they do not materially al-
ter the events or objects that they are supposed to portray.1 47 Even
if a reenactment does not contain a material alteration, however, it
can be misleading. A reenactment of one party's version of an inci-
dent, for example, can lead the viewer to accept that party's
version.1
48
A reenactment also can mislead the viewer by creating an un-
warranted impression of certainty. Because any event involves nu-
merous variables, many of which are uncertain, exact duplication
of an event may be impossible. In Pittman v. Mississippi Power &
note 3, § 711.
143. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
144. See 2 C. ScoTT, supra note 3, § 712; 3 id. § 1298.
145. See, e.g., People v. Long, 38 Cal. App. 3d, 113 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1974); Culpepper v.
Volkswagen of Am., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510, 109 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1973); Baker v. State, 241 So.
2d 683 (Fla. 1970); Mize v. Skeen, 63 Tenn. App. 37, 468 S.W.2d 733 (1971).
146. Harmon v. Board of Retirement, 62 Cal. App. 3d 689, 133 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1976);
Cansdale v. Board of Admin., Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys., 59 Cal. App. 3d 656, 130
Cal Rptr. 880 (1976); Mathias v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 93 IlM. App. 2d 258, 236 N.E.2d 331
(1968); Alford v. Bailey, 202 Pa. Super. 324, 196 A.2d 393 (1963); see infra notes 156-58 and
accompanying text.
147. American State Bank v. County of Woodford, 55 IMI. App. 3d 123, 133, 371 N.E.2d
232, 239 (1977); see also Summit County Dev. Corp. v. Bagnoli, 166 Colo. 27, 441 P.2d 658
(1968) (motion picture excluded because it did not depict accurately the conditions at the
time of the accident); Owens v. Thornton, 349 So. 2d 431 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (motion pic-
ture reenactment improperly admitted because it did not depict accurately the vehicles in
an accident). Courts may admit motion pictures that contain altered conditions if the pic-
tures are not offered as reconstructions of the event in question. See, e.g., Hueper v. Good-
rich, 263 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1978).
148. French v. City of Springfield, 65 M11. 2d 74, 82, 357 N.E.2d 438, 442 (1976).
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Light Company,1" 9 for example, the defendant offered a motion
picture showing that no telephone pole could withstand the pres-
sure generated when the plaintiff's decedent hit the guy wire of a
telephone pole with his tractor. The Supreme Court of Mississippi
held that the trial court erred in admitting the motion picture be-
cause material variations existed between the events in the motion
picture and the circumstances of the accident, and also because
some factors could not be duplicated.150 The court noted, for exam-
ple, that the speed of the tractor, the gear in which it was operat-
ing, and the point of impact were all unknown. 1'5
Using a party's own actors to stage a reenactment also raises
questions of manipulation. "[A]ny movie is a manufactured, self-
serving piece of evidence. It is true, of course, that all evidence
may be said in one sense to be self-serving. However, not all evi-
dence is a staged production whose finale is not only hoped for but
very much part of the script."' 52
Wilson v. Piper Aircraft153 involved a self-serving motion picture
with a particularly dramatic impact. In Wilson, the plaintiffs al-
leged that an aircraft's shoulder harnesses were not crashworthy.
To support their allegation, the plaintiffs offered to supplement
their expert testimony with motion picture evidence. Although the
Federal Aviation Administration had prepared the motion pictures
before the events that led to the lawsuit, the plaintiffs' expert had
supervised the production of one of the motion pictures. Entitled
"Restraints for Survival," the motion picture was designed to im-
press viewers with the need for upper torso restraints to protect
aircraft occupants. The film included "dramatic music, repeated
149. 368 So. 2d 238 (Miss. 1979).
150. Id. at 240; see also 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 798a.
151. 368 So. 2d at 240.
152. Balian v. General Motors, 121 N.J. Super. 118, 128, 296 A.2d 317, 322 (1972); see also
Pisel v. Stamford Hosp., 180 Conn. 314, 324, 430 A.2d 1, 8 (1980) ("When a film represents a
staged reproduction of one party's version of the facts it should be examined with care be-
cause of the danger that the filmmaker's art may blur reality in the minds of the jury.")
(citing McCoRMCK, supra note 10, § 214); 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 798a ("[T]he
party's hired agents may so construct [a reenactment] as to go considerably further in his
favor than the witnesses' testimony has gone, And yet, any motion picture is apt to cause
forgetfulness of this and to impress the jury with the convincing impartiality of Nature
herself.").
153. 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978).
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views of what appear[ed] to be a dead body beside the wreckage of
a small airplane, and closeups of dummies used in test crashes,
their faces smeared with red to simulate blood."'15 Rather than fo-
cusing on the relevance of the motion picture, the Oregon Supreme
Court identified the picture's emotional appeal as the basis for
holding that the trial court had properly excluded the evidence."'
Refutation of Disability Claims
Motion pictures used to refute disability claims also raise ques-
tions of distortion and reliability. Courts generally admit these mo-
tion pictures if relevant in personal injury actions involving disa-
bility claims,158  workmen's compensation cases,' 57  and suits
involving disability benefits under an insurance policy.158 The dra-
matic impact of these motion pictures is not objectionable in itself.
Their potential for deception, however, deserves closer attention.
The speed of a motion picture can misrepresent an allegedly dis-
abled person's physical capabilities. In Powell v. Industrial Com-
mission,59 for example, an employer offered motion pictures de-
picting the claimant at work in a gas station to refute a claim of
lost earning capacity. The referee admitted the motion pictures
over the claimant's objection, but stated in his summary to the Ar-
izona Industrial Commission that the motion picture depicted the
claimant moving faster than he actually was moving at the time.
Holding that the admission of the motion picture constituted re-
versible error on the issue of lost earning capacity, the Arizona
Court of Appeals recognized that few forms of evidence could dam-
age a compensation suit more than a motion picture showing the
claimant working faster than he was actually capable of working. 60
154. Id. at 77, 577 P.2d at 1331.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Essary v. Fitts, 467 P.2d 173 (Okla. 1970); Bernardy v. O.K. Furniture &
Rug Co., 385 P.2d 909 (Okla. 1963).
157. See, e.g., Scott v. Wasielewski, 89 Ariz. 29, 357 P.2d 614 (1960); Bonner v. General
Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 136 So. 2d 412 (La. Ct. App. 1961).
158. See, e.g., Kortz v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 144 F.2d 676 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 728 (1944); Alessandro v. Massachusetts Casualty Ins. Co., 232 Cal. App. 2d 203, 42
Cal. Rptr. 630 (1965).
159. 4 Ariz. App. 172, 418 P.2d 602 (1966), vacated, 102 Ariz. 11, 423 P.2d 348 (1967).
160. It is difficult to imagine any evidence more damaging to a compensation claim-
ant than the motion pictures as shown, which were taken or projected so as to
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Similarly, a motion picture showing a series of separate actions in a
rapidly accelerated succession also would decrease a disability
claimant's chance of recovery. le
Videotapes
Videotapes, 162 which are subject to the same admissibility stan-
dard that courts apply to photographs and motion pictures, 63 pre-
sent many of the same problems. To the extent that a proponent
uses videotapes for the same purpose as motion pictures, video-
tapes present the same problems. Videotaped reenactments, for ex-
ample, can contain material alterations in the events or objects
portrayed.6 4 Videotapes of the activities of disability claimants
also can be misleading because they can make actions that oc-
curred at different times or over a long period of time appear to
occur within a short, uninterrupted time period.1 65
show the claimant working at a rate of speed different from the speed under
which he actually worked when the picture was taken.
4 Ariz. App. at 180, 418 P.2d at 610. See also Utley v. Heckinger, 235 Ark. 780, 362 S.W.2d
13 (1962) (motion picture that accelerated personal injury plaintiff's movements inadmissi-
ble). A motion picture that decelerates a person's movements also would tend to mislead.
See Snyder v. American Car & Foundry, 322 Mo. 147, 157, 14 S.W.2d 603, 607 (1929)
(dicta).
161. [E]vidence in the form of moving pictures must be used with great caution,
because such pictures show only very brief intervals of the activities of the
subject, they do not show rest periods, they do not reflect whether the subject
is suffering pain, and they do not show the after effects of his activities.
Lambert v. WoWs, Inc., 132 So. 2d 522, 527 (La. Ct. App. 1961). See also Powell v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 4 Ariz. App. 172, 180, 418 P.2d 601, 610 (1966) (despite admitting motion
picture of compensation claimant working at a gas station, referee's report noted that it
showed the claimant" 'only when he was moving, and not during periods when he was rest-
ing' "), vacated, 102 Ariz. 11, 423 P.2d 348 (1967).
162. Videotapes are "motion pictures made by recording both sight and sound electroni-
cally on magnetic tape," although technically videotapes, unlike motion picture film, bear
electronic impulses rather than a series of still pictures. 2 C. Sco, supra note 3, § 1294.
See generally J. BERNSTEIN, VIDEO TAPE RECORDING (1960).
163. See supra notes 10 & 12 and accompanying text; see also 3 C. Scorr, supra note 3,
§ 1294 (Supp. 1980) (emphasizing the absence of any admissibility distinction between vide-
otapes and motion pictures).
164. See, e.g., Eiland v. State, 130 Ga. App. 428, 203 S.E.2d 619 (1973).
165. Niles Police Dep't v. Industrial Comm'n, 83 1. 2d 528, 416 N.E.2d 243 (1981); Or-
geron v. Tri-State Rd. Boring, 434 So. 2d 65, 68 (La. 1983) ("[E]vidence in the form of
moving pictures or videotapes must be approached with great caution because they show
only intervals of the activities of the subject, they do not show rest periods, and do not
reflect whether the subject is suffering during or after the activity.").
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Videotapes are used for a variety of other purposes as well.'"8
The increasingly popular filmed deposition is almost exclusively
recorded on videotape.1 7 Police departments use videotapes to re-
cord and preserve sobriety tests 68 and confessions.6 9 They also
use videotapes to monitor criminal activity in undercover fencing
operations. 17 0 Courts1 71 and commentators '7" alike have given over-
One fault that videotapes do not share with motion pictures is the deceptive representa-
tion of movement when the speed of a motion picture is altered. If the speed of a videotape
is not uniform, the picture will distort horizontally, a phenomenon known to technicians as
"video tape breakup." Case Comment, Evidence-Admission of Video Tape: Hendricks v.
Swenson, 38 Mo. L. REv. 111, 116 & n.42 (1973).
166. Lawyers and police officers prefer videotapes to motion pictures for many reasons.
Videotapes offer such advantages as instant replay, immediate results without processing
delays, tape reusability, and the ability to monitor both picture and sound as they are re-
corded. 2 C. Scorr, supra note 3, § 714 (Supp. 1980); 3 id. § 1333. Videotape recorders can
record action and sound simultaneously, without the accessory equipment needed to make a
simultaneous sound recording for a motion picture. See 2 id. § 714. Videotape recorders are
also much easier to use than motion picture cameras. 3 id. § 1333; see also Cunningham,
Videotape Evidence: Technological Innovation in the Trial Process, 36 AI. LAw. 228, 230
& n.9 (1970). Finally, videotapes are less expensive than motion pictures. 2 C. Sco'rr, supra
note 3, § 714 (Supp. 1980).
167. See, e.g., Carson v. Burlington N. Inc., 52 F.R.D. 492 (D. Neb. 1971); State ex rel.
Johnson v. Circuit Court, 61 Wis. 2d 1, 212 N.W.2d 1 (1972). But see Bailey v. Superior
Court, 19 Cal. 3d 970, 568 P.2d 394, 140 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1977) (declining to permit video-
taped depositions without express legislative authority). The 1970 amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure allow parties by stipulation to record a deposition electroni-
cally. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4); see also UNw. Atmio-vsuAL DEPOSITION [AcT] [RuLE] §§ 1-
10, 12 U.L.A. 11-14 (Supp. 1984). See generally 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MLER, FEDERAL PRAc-
TICE & PROCEDURE § 2115 (Supp. 1980).
168. See Comment, Judicial Administration-Technological Advances-Use of Video-
tape in the Courtroom and the Stationhouse, 20 DP. PAUL L. Rav. 924, 946-47 (1971); Com-
ment, The Role of Videotape in the Criminal Court, 10 SuFFoLK U.L. REv. 1107, 1110
(1976).
169. See Barber & Bates, Videotape in Criminal Proceedings, 25 HAsTINGs L.J. 1017,
1020-25 (1974); Comment, The Role of Videotape in the Criminal Court, supra note 168, at
1110.
170. See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 567 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Bennett v. State,
_ Ind. - 423 N.E.2d 588 (Ind. 1981); People v. Barker, 101 Mich. App. 599, 300
N.W.2d 648 (1980); State v. Luster, 306 N.C. 566, 295 S.E.2d 421 (1982). A widely publicized
use of videotapes in undercover law enforcement operations concerned the cases arising
from the "Abscam" incident, in which F.B.I. agents videotaped several congressmen ac-
cepting bribes. See United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 2437 (1983); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. My-
ers, 635 F.2d 932 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980).
171. See, e.g., Blumberg v. Dornbusch, 139 N.J. Super. 433, 436, 354 A.2d 351, 353 (1976)
("Videotape is neither new nor can it be considered an experimental electronic novelty.");
Rubino v. G.D. Searle & Co., 73 Misc. 2d 447, 449, 340 N.Y.S.2d 574, 577 (1973) ("[A]ny
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whelming approval to the use of such videotaped evidence.
Several criticisms may be levelled at the use of videotaped depo-
sitions. Consciously or inadvertently, the cameraman can present a
biased view of a witness' testimony by altering the camera's per-
spective. 17 3 Focusing exclusively on the witness during a deposi-
tion, for example, emphasizes his testimony more than the examin-
ing attorney's questions. 174
Another problem concerns the jury's perception of the witness'
demeanor. Courts and commentators have stressed that videotaped
depositions are superior to written transcripts because videotapes
can show the witness' demeanor.175 When jurors see a videotape of
a witness, however, they cannot perceive the witness' demeanor;
they can perceive only the videotape's rendition of the witness' de-
meanor. 76 Lens variations and camera positions may lead jurors to
timidity by this court in exercising its discretion in sustaining the present motion [for an
order permitting a videotaped deposition] will frustrate an avenue of great procedural sig-
nificance in the efficient and economic administration of justice.").
172. See Balbanian, Medium v. Tedium: Video Depositions Come of Age, 7 LrTIGMON 25
(1980); Salomon, The Use of Video Tape Depositions in Complex Litigation, 51 CAL. ST.
B.J. 20 (1976); Comment, Videotape Deposition: An Analysis of Use in Civil Cases, 9 Cum.
L. REv. 195 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Videotape Deposition]. Criticism of
videotape evidence generally concerns the prerecorded videotape trial, a novel scheme in
which the court deletes all objectionable material from a videotaped trial before the jury
views it. See Brakel, Videotape in Trial Proceedings: A Technological Obsession?, 61 A.B.
J. 956 (1975); Doret, Trial by Videotape-Can Justice Be Seen to Be Done?, 47 TEn,. L.Q.
228 (1974); Kosky, Videotape in Ohio, 59 JUDICATURE 230 (1975); Comment, The Criminal
Videotape Trial: Serious Constitutional Questions, 55 OR. L. Rhv. 567 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Criminal Videotape].
173. See Doret, supra note 172, at 234-35; Kosky, supra note 172, at 237.
174. Comment, Videotape Deposition, supra note 172, at 224. But cf. McCrystal, First
Videotape Trial: Experiment in Ohio, 21 DEF. L.J. 267, 276 (1972) (recognizing the capabil-
ity of videotapes to emphasize or subordinate roles, but considering this capability an ad-
vantage in a prerecorded videotape trial).
175. See, e.g., Mayor & Aldermen v. Palmerio, 135 Ga. App. 147, 153, 217 S.E.2d 430, 434
(1975); State ex rel. Lucas v. Moss, 498 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Mo. 1973) (en banc); Blumberg v.
Dornbusch, 139 N.J. Super. 433, 438, 354 A.2d 351, 354 (1976); Miller, Videotaping the Oral
Deposition, PRAC. LAW., Feb. 1972, at 45, 57; Comment, Videotape Depositions: An Alter-
native to the Incarceration of Alien Material Witnesses, 5 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 376, 395
(1975).
176. Stores v. State, 625 P.2d 820, 828 (Alaska 1980) ("Significant differences exist be-
tween testimony by videotape and testimony face-to-face with the jury. Videotapes may
affect the jurors' impressions of the witness' demeanor and credibility."); Brakel, supra note
172, at 957 ("[T]he medium cannot capture the total psychological and physical essence of a
witness-persuasiveness, credibility, hesitancy, and forcefulness are indicated through arm,
hand or eye movements or other bodily changes."); Kosky, supra note 172, at 237.
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miss subtle nuances that ordinarily would change their evaluation
of the witness' credibility."
Videotaped confessions raise more troubling questions, some of
which involve the constitutional rights of the accused. In Hen-
dricks v. Swenson, 78 for example, the police had videotaped the
defendant's confession to a first-degree murder charge and the de-
fendant then appealed his conviction on the ground that the con-
fession was involuntary. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit held that the defendant voluntarily made the
videotaped confession, and that the district court properly admit-
ted the confession into evidence.17 9 Although the Eighth Circuit's
narrow holding in Hendricks focused on voluntariness, the major-
ity and the dissenting opinions extended their analyses to related
questions. The majority noted that rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure permits depositions in criminal trials and
that courts likewise should permit confessions because no relevant
distinction exists between depositions and confessions.180 The
court stressed that videotaped confessions protect an accused,
rather than endanger him, because they prevent the police from
overreaching, and because they corroborate the accused when he
gives his confession involuntarily.1 81
The court also summarily addressed whether the videotaped
confession violated the defendant's fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Because the state does not violate an ac-
cused's privilege against self-incrimination by presenting a photo-
graph or a blood sample at trial, the court reasoned that the use of
a videotaped deposition likewise did not violate the privilege. 82
Concluding its analysis, the court endorsed videotaped confessions
as "a forward step in the search for truth."' 83
Reasoning that the confession was involuntary, the dissent ar-
gued that the videotape was inadmissible. 84 Assuming that the de-
177. Comment, Criminal Videotape, supra note 172, at 574-76.
178. 456 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1972).
179. Id. at 504-05.
180. Id. at 505.
181. Id. at 506.
182. Id. at 506-07.
183. Id.
184. Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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fendant did confess voluntarily, the dissent nevertheless would
have excluded the videotape unless safeguards were established to
prevent the inherent problems created by videotapes in the confes-
sion context.18 5 The dissent recognized at least three distinctions
between videotaped confessions and videotaped depositions. First,
voluntariness typically is not an issue in a deposition situation.
Second, the entire transaction is videotaped in a deposition but the
entire interrogation of a suspect is not. Third, the witness at a dep-
osition generally has counsel to represent his interests. 86
The dissent was concerned primarily with the potential for de-
ception in videotaped confessions. Although the procedure for
charging an accused involves many stages, including the reading of
Miranda warnings, the videotape shows only a final step in the
process-the confession.' The appearance of the accused on
videotape also can be deceiving. Videotape tends to roughen the
appearance of the subject, emphasizing physical characteristics
such as scars, blemishes, and beards,' 88 as well as unpleasant be-
havioral characteristics.' 8 The dissent added that, "[iln order to
present even a normal appearance on videotape, most persons
must be made up or otherwise prepared."'9
A videotape probably will have a more dramatic effect than a
written statement because the fleeting nature of visual images on a
videotape leaves less time for critical analysis.' 9' Because of this
phenomenon, and because of "the quality of 'liveness' in a video-
185. Id. at 507-09.
186. Id. at 508.
187. Id. at 507-08; cf. Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1969) (videotaped confes-
sion that was an accurate reproduction of the entire interview between the officer and de-
fendant obviated the state's need to show a chain of custody of the videotape), vacated and
remanded, 408 U.S. 935 (1972).
188. 458 F. 2d at 508 (Heany, J., dissenting) (citing H. ZErrl, TELLaISION PRODUCTION
HANDBOOK 370 (2d ed. 1968)). The exaggerated unshaven appearance of Vice President
Nixon in the televised 1960 Nixon-Kennedy debates exemplifies the unexpected distortions
that result from peculiarities in the videotape process. See T. WHrE, THE MAKING OF THE
PRESIDENT, 1960, at 289-90 (1961); cf. McMenomin, Was McLuhan Right?, EDuc. INDus.
TELEv sION, Oct. 1975, at 45 (students who viewed their teacher on television were more
critical and displayed less empathy toward him than students who viewed the same teacher
in person).
189. 456 F. 2d at 508 (Heany, J., dissenting) (citing H. ZErrL, supra note 188, at 342).
190. 456 F.2d at 508 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (citing H. Z7MrL, supra note 188, at 369-87).
191. 456 F.2d at 508 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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taped confession," the dissent argued that admission of the video-
tape essentially compelled the defendant to take the stand and in-
criminate himself.192  Moreover, without knowing the full
implications of a videotaped confession, the accused could not vol-
untarily waive his rights.193 The dissent in Hendricks acknowl-
edged the distortive capabilities of videotaped confessions, al-
though the majority skirted the issue by assuming disputed
facts.'" Nevertheless, most courts have followed the approach
adopted by the majority in Hendricks.9 '
X-Rays
X-rays 96 are the least objectionable form of photographic evi-
dence because of their overall reliability and accuracy.1 97 Because
X-rays are photographic representations of internal body struc-
tures, testimony that the X-ray accurately represents a subject
would be absurd.198 Instead, testimony regarding the X-ray process
and hospital identification procedures is used to lay the foundation
necessary to authenticate .an X-ray.199 Several courts have sug-
gested that the silent witness theory, which would treat X-rays as
self-authenticating evidence, is the best theory for admitting X-
rays into evidence.2 00 The admissibility standard for X-rays, there-
fore, has become increasingly liberal.
192. Id. at 509.
193. Id.
194. If a proper foundation is laid for the admission of a video tape by showing
that it truly and correctly depicted the events and persons shown, and that it
accurately reproduced the defendant's confession, we feel that it is an advance-
ment in the field of criminal procedure and a protection of defendant's rights.
456 F.2d at 506.
195. See, e.g., Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 261 S.E.2d 349 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
938 (1980); People v. Ardella, 49 IMI. 2d 517, 276 N.E.2d 302 (1971); State v. Lusk, 452
S.W.2d 219 (Mo. 1970); State v. Shive, 624 S.W.2d 136 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
196. The light-sensitive materials used in photography also respond to the radiation
transmitted by X-rays. Thus, when transmitted through a subject, the X-rays will reveal on
film a black and white image created by the subject's varying resistance to the passing radi-
ation. D. CHEsTY & M. CHEsNEY, RADIOGRAPMC PHOTOGRAPHY 3-4 (2d ed. 1969).
197. 2 C. ScoTr, supra note 3, § 631.
198. See Fisher v. State, 7 Ark. App. 1, 7, 643 S.W.2d 571, 574 (1982); Bergner v. State,
- Ind. App. , 397 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (1979).
199. 3 C. ScoTT, supra note 3, § 1263.
200. See supra note 198.
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Some courts, for example, have tacitly presumed the reliability
of a hospital's X-ray and identification procedures. 20 1 Courts also
have allowed testimony by physicians who were not present at the
taking of the X-rays to establish authenticity,202 and other courts
have admitted X-rays under the business documents exception to
the hearsay rule.203 Although these liberal approaches raise ques-
tions of potential misidentification,204 X-rays are less likely to
deceive than other forms of photographic evidence.20 5 Thus, X-ray
evidence that has been properly authenticated deserves substantial
weight.
201. Modem day hospital practice is such that the radiologist very likely does not
see the patient, the treating doctor is not present when the X-rays are exposed
or read, and he may well rely heavily upon the radiologist's report in diagnos-
ing and treating his patient's condition. X-rays are made with proper identify-
ing marks and the trained radiologist can determine from the film itself as to
whether the exposure is proper and the film diagnostic. When these safeguards
are accepted in the hospital, we see no reason why they should not be similarly
accepted in court....
Banks v. Bowman Dairy Co., 65 IlM. App. 2d 113, 116-17, 212 N.E.2d 4, 6 (1965). See also
State v. Senegal, 333 So. 2d 639 (La. 1976) (X-ray identification system used by hospital
supported admission of X-rays); Texaco, Inc. v. Pursley, 527 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975) (hospital records of X-rays supported their admission).
202. See Oxford v. Villines, 232 Ark. 103, 334 S.W.2d 660 (1960); Chailland v. Smiley, 363
S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1963) (en banc); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Waters, 356 S.W.2d 209
(Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
203. See State v. Torres, 60 Hawaii 271, 589 P.2d 83 (1978); Dana v. Von Pichl, 39
A.D.2d 744, 332 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1972).
204. Cf. Smith v. Smith, 125 Ga. App. 257, 259, 187 S.E.2d 330, 333 (1972) ("[X]-rays
[taken before an accident that was the subject of a personal injury action] prove only that
some person or persons ... had x-rays made of various parts of the body at various times
prior to the date of [the accident].").
205. See 2 C. ScoTt, supra note 3, § 631. Potentially, lost detail through improper expo-
sure or other variables could render an X-ray deceptive, or at least reduce its overall eviden-
tiary value. Underexposing X-rays causes lost detail in the film's transparent parts; overex-
posure causes lost detail in the film's dark parts. 2 id. § 638. Other factors that generally
could cause poor detail include "movement of the subject, too short a distance between X-
ray tube and film. .. and use of an X-ray tube having too large a focal spot." Id. § 637. In
practice, however, the expertise of X-ray technicians minimizes these potential distortions.
See id. § 638. Unlike other photographic evidence, X-rays always are taken by a profes-
sional under controlled conditions. "Furthermore, X-ray films often are developed while the
patient waits so that the picture can be retaken if an examination of the film proves that it
has been exposed faultily." Id.
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DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT OF
PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE: A PROPOSED TEST
Despite its general utility, photographic evidence has numerous
potential deficiencies that affect not only its admissibility, but also
its evidentiary weight. Variations of lenses and camera position can
render a photograph dangerously deceptive. 06 Other variables,
such as lighting, film type, lens filters, camera quality, exposure,
development techniques, and perceptual errors, also can render a
photograph misleading.0 7 Regardless of technical accuracy, a pho-
tograph may influence the factfinder improperly.20 8 Although the
prejudicial impact of a gruesome photograph may not outweigh
substantially its probative value, the photograph's gruesome na-
ture almost ensures that the photograph will induce some prejudi-
cial effect. Finally, motion pictures20 9 and videotapes210 add dis-
tinct problems to the question of how much evidentiary weight
photographic evidence deserves.
Existing case law indicates that photographic evidence has re-
ceived increased acceptance from the legal profession.21 The silent
witness theory of admissibility2 2 and the willingness of some
courts to give photographs conclusive weight 1 3 are concrete exam-
ples of this trend. The implicit rationale for the liberal admissibil-
ity standard is that photographic evidence is an inherently reliable
product of a scientific process. 21 4 The scientific nature of the pro-
cess, however, justifies liberal admissibility standards only to the
extent that the process is reliable. Consequently, courts should use
an evidentiary test that focuses on the reliability of photographic
evidence to minimize unjustified reliance on unworthy evidence.
In determining admissibility, courts should recognize the poten-
tial for deception and prejudice in the use of photographic evi-
dence and should exclude the evidence if it could deceive or un-
206. See supra text accompanying notes 69-86.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 87-115.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 116-41.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 142-61.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 162-95.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 30-62.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 39-55.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
214. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
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duly prejudice the jury. If courts continue to liberally admit
photographic evidence under the pictorial testimony theory and
the silent witness theory, however, they should look to other indi-
cia of its reliability to determine the appropriate evidentiary
weight that the factfinder should accord such evidence. Allowing
the jury to determine evidentiary weight without judicial guidance
encourages unprincipled reliance on photographic evidence simply
because of the scientific nature or dramatic effect of the evidence.
An evidentiary test should prevent unprincipled reliance by exam-
ining the reliability and pertinence of photographic evidence.
One commentator has suggested that photographic evidence
should receive as much weight as its authentication justifies.2 15
This proposition is an essential premise in constructing an effec-
tive test for photographic evidence, but falls short of complete ef-
fectiveness: Cases arise in which photographic evidence creates un-
justified reliance but goes undisputed. Although a gruesome
photograph may be technically reliable, it can influence jurors im-
properly. To mitigate the inevitable prejudice resulting from the
admission of a gruesome photograph, the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court in State v. Stackpole216 offered the following effective jury
instruction:
This picture is going to be shown to the jury for whatever assis-
tance it may be to you in understanding the testimony of Dr.
Goodof. You will recall that his testimony was that death re-
sulted from a combination of asphyxia by ligature and exposure
to the elements. And it's hard for a doctor ... to describe the
condition of the neck. So this is being shown to you for only that
purpose. Now, pictures of this sort are repulsive to look at, but
you are supposed to be like doctors. You are supposed to look at
it calmly and in a detached way, and only for the purpose that I
am permitting you to see it, to see the condition of the neck.217
This instruction is effective for several reasons. Aside from its
overall reasonableness, the instruction mitigates the prejudicial ef-
fect of gruesome photographs in two ways. First, it skillfully places
jurors in an objective role. By telling jurors to assume a doctor's
215. Paradis, The Celluloid Witness, 37 U. COLo. L. REv. 235 (1965).
216. 349 A.2d 185 (Me. 1975).
217. Id. at 189 n.3.
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role, the instruction urges the jurors to reject their natural subjec-
tive responses. Because gruesome photographs are sometimes nec-
essary to the factfinding process, courts must encourage the jury to
show extraordinary objectivity. Second, the instruction focuses the
jurors' attention on the photograph's pertinent features. The court
is showing the photographic evidence to the jury because the testi-
mony is difficult to conceptualize. Unnecessary prejudice would be
more likely if the jury received the photograph without the in-
struction. The pertinence aspect of the instruction tells the jury to
consider the gruesome photograph only for a specific purpose, thus
mitigating potential prejudice.
The ideal evidentiary test for photographic evidence focuses not
only on the varying reliability of photographic evidence, but also
on its limited pertinence. For the test to be effective, the court
must adequately instruct the jury on both elements. To ensure re-
liability, the court should emphasize that, although the trial court
admitted the photographic evidence on the basis of a witness' tes-
timony or its own foundational basis, many factors affect the relia-
bility of photographic evidence. Admission represents merely a
minimal showing of reliability. Courts should emphasize the criti-
cal nature of lens variation and camera position. Lighting, film and
lens filter variations, camera quality, exposure, and the develop-
ment process also could be mentioned as relevant factors.218
If motion picture evidence is offered, the court should caution
the jury that the reliability of motion pictures also depends on
camera position and lens variations, as well as such distinct factors
as film speed, editing, and continuity of filming. Similarly, courts
218. The following instruction provides a good example:
I am asked to mention the subject of the photographs to you. I have admit-
ted these photographs in evidence, and they are put before you. You ought to
look at them with a great deal of caution. I suppose all of you know that a
photograph of natural scenery may be more or less misleading as to distance,
because of what photographers call perspective or want of perspective. You can
hardly judge accurately of distance from a mere inspection of these photo-
graphs. Therefore, do not be misled by these photographs in an estimate of
distance. These photographs tend to make the distances between near and far
objects appear ([greater] or [less]) than they are in fact. In that respect it is
fair to say that they are unavoidably misleading.
3 C. ScoTr, supra note 3, § 1565 (adapted from McLean v. Erie R. Co., 69 N.J.L. 57, 54 A.
238 (1903), aff'd, 70 N.J.L. 337, 57 A. 1132 (1904)).
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should instruct jurors that motion pictures and videotapes cannot
convey fully a witness' demeanor and that they may have peculiar
effects on a witness' appearance.
The pertinence standard applies primarily to gruesome photo-
graphs, although courts need not confine the standard to that con-
text. The proper approach depends on the subject of the gruesome
photograph and the issue upon which the court admits the evi-
dence. Courts should mitigate unnecessary prejudice by emphasiz-
ing to the jury the need for objectivity, and by focusing the jury's
attention on the pertinent features of the photograph.21
The proposed test provides a flexible framework from which to
determine the evidentiary value of photographic evidence and, ul-
timately, the weight that it deserves. 220 The test is flexible because
it offers a sliding scale, rather than a rigid formula for assigning
evidentiary value. The weight deserved by photographic evidence
increases as the number of reliability indicia increase. Even unwit-
nessed photographic evidence from automatic surveillance equip-
ment deserves substantial weight, for example, because other relia-
bility indicators justify that weight.22 1 To mitigate unnecessary
prejudice, however, the pertinence standard limits otherwise relia-
ble evidence, according to the subject of the photographic
evidence.
CONCLUSION
The current practice of allowing the jury unbridled discretion to
determine the weight given to photographic evidence is unsound.
The potential of photographic evidence to deceive or influence the
219. The instruction offered by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in State v. Stackpole,
349 A.2d 185 (Me. 1975), provides a useful model. See supra text accompanying note 217.
220. Although some states prevent charges on the weight of the evidence, the proposed
test would remain useful. Courts could apply the test through objective instructions that
allow the jury to determine independently the weight to accord photographic evidence. The
instructions would inform the jury of the general properties of photographic evidence that
make it potentially misleading, without discussing the specific evidence in issue. Courts in
these jurisdictions could avoid commenting to the jury about the weight that it should give
photographic evidence, yet ensure that the jury considered the evidence for the appropriate
purpose. Furthermore, the pertinence strand of the test is effectively a limiting instruction,
which is not equivalent to commenting on the weight of the evidence. 3 C. ScoTt, supra
note 3, § 1562.
221. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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jury improperly, combined with the increasing reliance on photo-
graphic evidence, requires courts to exercise greater control over
the reliability and weight accorded photographic evidence. The
proposed test enables courts to achieve this control.
The admission of photographic evidence does not indicate the
trial court's unqualified approval of its evidentiary value. Properly
administered through instructions, the proposed test alerts the
jury that photographic evidence may deserve less weight than it
initially appears to merit. Under this test, the weight given to pho-
tographic evidence will reflect more accurately its evidentiary
value.
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